INTRODUCTION
The rapid expansion of digital technology offers new possibilities of control and measurement system architecture with a favorable price ratio for computer components while improving reliability. Technological progress had a particularly significant impact on sensors and actuators, which evolved into intelligent devices communicating by the means of fieldbuses. From this point of view, a control system, which becomes a distributed system, is composed of devices that contain many functions and both interchange and share data [I] . Its particularity relates to data exchange between the devices via a communication medium supposed to be a network or a fieldbus. This medium constitutes a new element to be taken into account in the dependability studies.
This article is based on the reflection work of the working group on dependability of the CIAME-SEE (Constituants Intelligents pour I'Automatisation et la Mesure -SocittC des
Electriciens et Electroniciens I Intelligent Components for
Automation and Measurement -Electricity and Electronics Society). Industrialists, research workers and users working on fieldbuses, intelligent/smart sensors and actuators take part in the work of this group.
This paper provides an overview of the constraints related to fieldbuses and presents the results of the dependability study of the "communicating" function related to fieldbuses.
FIELDBUS COMPONENT
The presence of a network has introduced an additional functionality, namely "communication", which was implicit with pin stripe wiring. From this point of view, the functional decomposition of these two architectures is given by Figure  1 , which shows that the "communication" function constitutes a component of the system. It can be placed at the same level than the other components and consequently its dependability (and its different failure modes) must be studied with the same methods: the problem is to prove that the dependability of a distributed architecture is greater than or equal to that of a centralized architecture 
FIELDBUSES AND DEPENDABILITY
The type of production environment determines largely the usable fieldbuses. Thereby, some fieldbuses are dedicated to specific areas such as home networking (EIB, Batibus, . . .. .) [3] . Other important criteria include cost, confidentiality, and compatibility with equipment. According to these criteria, the designer has to choose a material architecture, and particularly a fieldbus system what also depends on factors such as application size, data throughput, and integration oftime constraints.
The choice of a fieldbus and the retained architecture must be based on the means of dependability in order to predict, to combat, to eliminate or to tolerate the faults identified during the design phase. The dependability is a complex concept, which can not be studied with a single point of view. It is thanks to the availability, the reliability, the maintainability and the safety that the dependability can be characterized in case of product systems [4] . The general measures to be applied to achieve this objective are presented from the reduced ISO/OSI model (Open System Interconnection) model (Physical layer, Data Connection layer, Application layer), according to the category claimed by the application using a fieldbus type communication system. The OS1 model is normally composed of 7 layers [SI. These 7 layers are reduced to 3 layers for time constraints fieldbus systems: the physical layer which codes and transmits bits on the medium, the data link layer that manages frames and controls access to the medium, -the application layer, which includes all the services available to a user application. Figure 2 shows the three-layer communication system for a time constraint fieldbus system. The protocol for this triplelayer-reduced architecture is described in European standard EN 60870 "Safety systems for remote control". To identify the failure modes of the "communication" function, the causes, and the effects on the control system, an inductive approach based on a FMECA analysis (Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis) is carried out [6].
The FMECA analysis of the failure modes of these three parts and their possible causes (internal or external causes) aims at leading to a better understanding of the "communication" function.
With this in mind, our study aims at establishing the relationship between a given failure mode and the layer of the OS1 model. The means of detection being located in another layer as shall he seen further. It should be borne in mind that a failure mode of a component is defined as the effect allowing observation of the failure of this component.
--

IV.
THE PHYSICAL LAYER
By its passive nature a serial electrical bus has a very low failure rate. Nevertheless, the failures that can occur with the medium are fatal for the communication system: impedance mismatch or breakage circuit. The medium is therefore a solid point of the system. Two failure modes can be identified:
1 ) The non-reception of signals by one or several sites leads to a loss of information for the control system. It can be caused by:
-. disruption of transmission on the medium causing a partially or totally illegible frame,
-external aggression such as nipping, cuts, deformation, shocks, climatic conditions, senescence, impedance mismatch, line termination loss, etc.. .
--the non-connection of a subscriber meant to be connected to the network,
-a subscriber connected to the network but in short-circuit condition.
2) A continuous emission on the network (excessive dialogue) due to infinite.repetitions of transmission attempts, to an internal failure o f 8 component or to an avalanche of events can lead to overloading the network and to a sudden degradation in the system performance [7] .
To make the medium safe in relation to these faults, it is necessary to choose a transmission support compatible with environmental conditions. More often than not, the sheathed twisted pair is sufficient to protect transmissions from electromagnetic disturbance. Redundancy of the transmission medium in fieldbuses is a particularly delicate point. Networks openly demonstrate that operating safety has been taken into account; during their design, as they have redundancy of the medium. However, whereas field networks for critical applications have a redundant medium intended to increase the reliability and availability attributes of the communication system, ' this redundancy, such as it is managed in the majority of cases, contributes nothing to the safety attribute, The contradiction between safety attribute and availability attribute again comes into its own.
With error detection in mind, the redundant medium (as in the case of the previous complex communication system) must inot serve as an emergency medium but must be meant to ensure redundancy of the information transmitted at the physical layer level. The aim is to detect an error either on wire or on the redundant structures (if redundancy of the medium is accompanied by redundancy of the upper layers) by means of reciprocal comparison of their behavior. Such a configuration leads to further weakening of this solid point of the communication system: cataleptic failure of one or the other of the two mediums leading to complete failure of the communication system.
V. THE DATA LINK LAYER
The arrival of an erroneous frame at the Data Link Layer (of note is that this frame is necessarily complete, in other words not truncated as, according to the OS1 principle, the physical layer would not be transmitted to the data link layer) leads to non-valid information for the control system.
The efficiency of an error detector code employed at data link layer level must take into accounts the flow rate and criticality of the information transmitted as well as environmental disturbances.
The detection capability of the code must guarantee a low probability of the occurrence of an undetected fault. The other detection mechanisms that can accompany the error detection code are not in question (various redundancies: medium, information, and transmission redundancy). The authors have intentionally excluded specifying an acceptable quantitative limit for the efficiency of the error detection code (e.g., an error not detected within 20 years as laid down in standard EN 50170 [SI), as the problem is complex and depends on numerous criteria.
The data link layer is sometimes equipped with an error recovery mechanism following error detection. It should be noted that this recovery must only be employed if the system allows it temporally and if the integrity of the information is not reduced by this recovery.
For an application favoring the safety attribute, the recovery mechanism must not lead to a degraded state of the system (e.g. an error on a medium must not be recovered by pursuit on a redundant medium). For this reason, the new state following a transmission error that cannot be recovered otherwise, is a shutdown state. This state is a default state that must inexorably lead to shutdown of the dangerous system protected by the safety device. This default state is acceptable to the system insofar as it does not lead to a dangerous situation.
VI. THE APPLICATION LAYER
The more the communication system is responsible for controlling the time assigned to its communication, the more consideration should be given to the information transmission aspect. This paper is limited in scope to communication systems termed remote inputloutput networks or networks of senson/controllers that have the advantage of comprising a limited or at least a defined number of stations. The arrival of temporally erroneous information at the application layer leads to temporally invalid information. Non-respect of production deadlines and/or non-respect of transmission deadlines can be listed among the possible causes.
Besides the hardware aspect linked to internal failures or to external environmental failures, 'the integrity of the information transmitted and its temporal validity are fundamental to making the transmission safe in relation to certain faults.
In addition, the integrity of the information transmitted depends on the nature of the information carried. The context of our work leads us to distinguishing two types of information:
information termed safety such as: state and fault information, and information relative to safe-state control (shutdown orders). ~ -general operating information. The recommendations of this study apply only to transmissions of safety information: a safe fieldbus can have recourse to two protocols, each dedicated to two types of information. The communication system, despite its higher complexity, will be both safe (for the safety information) and efficient (for the general operating information). It is also possible to distinguish information stemming from direct safety critical functions whose malfunction has an immediate adverse effect from that stemming from indirect safety functions whose failure engenders no immediate risk but does lower the safety level.
VII. FIELDBUS MANAGEMENT
Fieldbus management is highly dependent on the network -in certain protocols, it appears as a vertical layer grafted ~ in others, management is carried out at application layer studied:
on to the OS1 model (See figure 3) , level.
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Figure 3 Fieldbus management in certain protocols
Fieldbus management raises the problems of the "nondetection of the disappearance of a station" or "non-detection of the appearance of a station" which can be catastrophic if the station concerned manages access to the network. In this case, the effect for the control system is an interruption of access to the medium.
In ASI, the master possesses the list of active stations and updates it. In CANopen, the disappearance of a station is detected at application layer level by a Node Guarding function, It should be noted that a failure at the network management layer level could stem from a design fault or an operational fault. An example of this is the case of two stations assigned the same address during the design phase or following a maintenance operation.
VIII. EVALUATION OF THE DEPENDABILITY OF THE OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE
A. Communication approach
The communication approach presented in this paper aims at focusing on the communication function and is the first step for the evaluation of the operational architecture. As it is mentioned before, this function is the core of the distributed architecture or system. The methodology purpose is to validate the criticality characteristics of the fieldbus network, both its whole real-time capacities and its ability or not to ensure the arrival of a high-criticality and high-priority information within a restricted temporal window.
For a fieldbus based system, evaluation of the dependability can be viewed with quantitative, semiquantitative or only qualitative point of view [9]. This valuation is very difficult because of the diversity of the applications and the great number of failure possibilities.
Several approaches exist for the dependability valuation; but in the case of system design, the chosen method has to allow several solutions to be compared and so several reliability and maintainability levels to be envisaged. The final aim in such an approach is to find the best ratio availability/safety/cost by acting upon reliability and Field feedback provides a number of results about the behavior of automation components and allows quantification of the probability of failure. This data allow to a quantitative study to be performed. But they are often difficult to obtain and the environment has a great impact on these values. Nevertheless a qualitative or semi-qualitative study can be made more easily. It consists in identifying the weak points, in classifying them and in determining the means to avoid them.
